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Arab countries (ACs) started their developmental process several years back. However, 
they still suffer from numerous economic, political and social problems, culminating in 
poor livelihoods, which was a key focus of the recent ‘Arab Spring’. This paper aims to 
contribute to the continuing debate on the factors that boost economic growth in the ACs 
in comparison to other regions in the world with an emphasis on the often neglected role of 
governance in growth. The analysis is underpinned by a neoclassical growth framework 
augmented with institutional controls, and panel data estimation techniques applied to a 
balanced panel data set over the period 1995 to 2014 for 97 countries including 19 from the 
Arab Region. The study found strong evidence of a significant positive impact of human 
capital and investment on growth but a significantly negative impact of regulatory quality. 
The most striking result from the baseline model is that the coefficient of governance is 
significant and positively determines growth in the whole sample, while it is negative in 
ACs sample. The outcomes of the empirical analyses clearly underline the importance of 
human capital and governance to improve the growth prospects of the ACs economies. The 
latter variable may have additional benefits of minimising the occurrence of political and 
economic instability leading to such events as the ‘Arab Spring’. 
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Economic, social and political failures in the Arab region have strongly been attributed to 
the 2011 self-immolation by Mohamed Bouazizi, a local street vendor in Tunisia outraged 
by police corruption (Brisson, 2012).  This ignited a wave of protests that spread throughout 
most of the Arab region, popularly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’.  The Arab street seemed 
to have made clear that it is no longer willing to accept poor public services, and a private 
sector made up of politically well-connected businessmen who earn huge profits by political 
connections, which allows them to avoid taxes and charge non-competitive prices. 
Seeking the reasons for the ‘Arab Spring’, this paper aims to investigate the factors that 
determine growth in Arab economies in comparison to other regions in the world with an 
emphasis on the role of governance in growth. The paper relies on a neoclassical growth 
framework to formalise the channel of institutional influence on growth as it holds a shift 
parameter that is capable of accounting for the impacts of numerous factors (including 
institutions) on total factor productivity.  That is, to examine the role of institutions in the 
growth trend of the Arab region underpinned by an extended neoclassical growth 
framework.  The institutional variables, which have been somewhat under-studied, are 
crucial if the Arab region is to attain more sustainable growth and limit the potential 
occurrence of such an ‘Arab Spring’ in the future. 
Arab countries (ACs) after their independence had a series of developmental processes.  By 
the mid-twentieth century, the independent states had formed the region’s new architecture, 
and a new era began. Since the 1950s and early 1960s, the development model in ACs was 
based on strong governments, central planning of economic and social priorities, and wide-
scale policies for redistribution and addressing equity issues. Most ACs invested in major 
infrastructure projects, education, and public health(Bibi and Nabli, 2010). With the end of 
the oil boom in the 1970s, however, economic performance gradually declined. By the mid-
1980s, the development model faced pressures for change because of the significant role 
played by oil revenues (Drine, 2012).  In the 1990s and 2000s the economic growth 
implications and attempts at reform, in addition to the emergence of a new development 
model were noticeable (Kireyev, 2000).   
Many ACs launched necessary economic reforms in line with programs prescribed by such 
international institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(Abbott et al., 2010). These reforms were mainly concerned with privatisation and trade 
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liberalisation, considered to be  a means with which to improve trading capacities and to 
attract more foreign direct investment (FDI).  At the same time, there were significant and 
critical challenges in the region during that period, such as, extremely high growth of the 
labour force, which was increasingly young, educated, and feminised (Bibi and Nabli, 
2010). 
Despite implementing these series of economic reforms with emphasis on stabilisation and 
structural adjustment in some ACs, these changes did not significantly affect the standards 
of living in these countries. Indeed, over the last fifteen years or so, growth performance 
of the Arab region as a whole has been disappointing (Harrigan and El-Said, 2011).  
Besides the poor economic conditions, there are weak governance and institutional 
frameworks, corruption and the increasing gaps between governmental policies and the 
needs and aspirations of the citizens.  
There is no doubt that political, economic and institutional conditions in ACs had a direct 
affect on economic performance and business activities. Emara and Jhonsa (2011) and 
Nabli (2007) have claimed that the low efficiency of capital in the MENA region can be 
associated to the fact that most countries in the region provide an unfriendly business 
environment and insufficient institutional support for private investment.  In addition, the 
region, according to the Freedom House (2015), had the worst civil liberties scores of any 
region, and most of its countries were classified as not free. 
In the light of the above, the ACs with regard to polity were designated by a top-down, 
personalised, highly concentrated and non-contestable mode of governing.  Economically, 
the region exhibited highly skewed income and property accumulation as well as resource 
allocation, and distribution of political power linked with highly centralised control of the 
ruling elite. In particular, under this politically and economically captured system, neither 
the middle nor the poor class were beneficiaries. 
It can be observed in Figure 1 of Appendix 1 that the economic growth rates in Arab 
countries during the last two decades have been unstable and remarkably volatile. Some of 
these fluctuations are due to exogenous variables related to changing world economic 
conditions. Additionally,  Figure 1 shows that on average, the trend of the growth rates of 
ACs follows almost the same pattern as other regions. For instance, the highest growth rate 
was 7% in 2004, while the worst rate was in 2009 following the global financial crisis in 
2008, similar to other regions.   
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Nevertheless,  estimating the GDP per capita functions across the period of the study in the 
ACs compared to other regions demonstrates that the ACs were the second worst region in 
the world only slightly above the poorest performing districts of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSF) 
as in Figure 2  of Appendix 1.  
These weak economic conditions, in addition to the poor socio-political environment, 
underpinned the “Arab Spring”. These protests led to leadership changes, administrative 
reforms, and a range of political, social, and economic changes that continue to reverberate 
today.  The focus has shifted towards discovering alternative explanations and a range of 
development policy options to help redress the underlying causes that gave rise to public 
grievances and discontent.  These claims were clearly encapsulated in the case of Egypt and 
Tunisia by the slogan, “Bread, freedom and social justice” – a slogan that emphasises the 
interdependence of inclusive governance, economic and social inclusion (UNDP, 2011).  
The ‘Arab Spring’ reflects not only a demand for jobs and improved living standards, but 
is also a protest against corruption, favouritism and unequal access to economic resources. 
The presence of these factors discourages broad-based sustainable investment, leads to a 
misallocation of public and private resources, and ultimately adversely affects economic 
performance.  This is the focus of the paper in examining the key role of institutions in 
ensuring more sustainable growth in the Arab region. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section is a brief overview of 
previous related studies, while Section 3 presents the methodology and the research model 
specification.  Section 4 discusses the results of the regression analyses, with the last section 
focusing on conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Previous Studies  
   2.1: Economic growth in Arab countries  
Several recent studies have analysed the growth pattern of the Arab region (Badawi and 
Makdisi, 2007, Bhattacharya and Wolde, 2010, Bibi and Nabli, 2010, Costello et al., 2015, 
Dasgupta et al., 2005, Makdisi et al., 2006, Nabli, 2007, Sullivan and Nadgrodkiewicz, 
2008, UNDP, 2011). Makdisi et al. (2006), for example, found that with very few 
exceptions, this growth pattern is considered to be inextricably linked to numerous 
characteristics of most of the countries in the region, their heavy dependence on oil, low 
rates of returns on investment in physical and human capital, weak economic base, high 
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population growth and unemployment rates, low level of integration in the world economy 
and underdevelopment of market institutions. 
 Some empirical studies have argued that labour skill shortages could well be another key 
constraint on growth in the MENA region.  Pissarides and Véganzonès (2006), for example, 
claimed that a prominent feature of the MENA economies, inherited from the experience 
of development, is human capital and the low stock of skilled labour compared to other 
countries with similar levels of per capita income. Moreover, the countries in the region 
continue to fail to deploy human capital efficiently despite high levels of education. This is 
mainly due to the existence of large public sectors, which distort incentives, and because of 
excessive regulations governing the industry. The authors argue that education systems in 
the ACs are mainly designed for the needs of the public sector, with the end that earned 
skills do not match those required in growth-enhancing businesses in the private sector.  
Irrelevant regulation of the private sector removes the incentives for employers to recruit 
and train good workers. The authors claim that labour market regulations in the region have 
historically been stringent and remain extremely tight compared with most developing 
countries, although not as high as those prevailing in the previously planned economies or 
in Latin America. 
 Moreover, several studies have emphasised the role of governance and institutional factors 
in explaining MENA’s relatively weak growth performance and other key macroeconomic 
indicators. Nabli (2003) provides empirical evidence that institutional capability, measured 
by international indices of the state’s ability to perform critical institutional functions, is 
strongly correlated with economic growth and its sources (investment and total factor 
productivity). Addtionally, Badawi and Makdisi (2007) show that the institutional 
capability affects the capacity of governments in the Arab region to implement policy 
change.  
Other researchers such as Emara and Jhonsa (2011) and Nabli (2007) have explained that 
the weak efficiency of capital in the MENA region can be associated with the fact that most 
ACs in the region provide an unfriendly business environment and inappropriate 
institutional support for investment and private sector development.  Makdisi et al. (2006) 
have also emphasised the significance of the quality of governance as well as of the stock 
of human capital in clarifying the low productivity performance of MENA countries in 
comparison with the rest of the world in general and particularly the high-performing East 
Asian countries.  
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Furthermore, Aysan et al. (2007) address the issue of the low level of private investment in 
the MENA region, with particular emphasis on the role of governance. The study estimated 
a simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic 
policies concurrently explain both variables. The empirical results showed that governance 
plays a significant role in private investment decisions. The same result in the case of 
"administrative quality" in the form of controllingcorruption, bureaucratic quality, the 
investment-friendly profile of administration, law and order, as well as for "political 
stability." The estimations also stress that structural reforms like financial development, 
trade openness, and human development affect private investment decisions directly, and/or 
through their positive effect on governance. 
To sum up, the current study opines that, ACs face a crucial choice. The weaknesses of past 
economic reforms foreshadow a potential social instability and massive labour crisis as the 
growing wave of youth unemployment sweeps through the region.  On the other hand, after 
the ‘Arab Spring’, ACs may have at hand a unique opportunity for sustained growth and 
development, given that long-overdue institutional reforms – both economic and political 
– are introduced.  
 
2.2: The Role of Governance and Capital on Economic Growth 
The reasons for economic development have been studied before Adam Smith made his 
inquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations. The first development economists 
concentrated primarily on the accumulation of physical capital as the driving force in 
economic growth. This emphasis on the accumulation of capital provided the intellectual 
impetus for the large sums of foreign relief provided to emerging countries by international 
aid agencies post–World War II. 
 In the 1960s and 1970s, the pioneering work of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) on 
human capital caused economists to expand their standard economic growth models to 
allow for human capital investment to play a role.  In  a study into the effects of education 
on economic growth,  Hall (2000) found that education seemed to clarify a significant share 
of economic growth. These results led development scholars to an emphasis on human 
capital as a key factor of production during the 1980s and 1990s (Coyne and Boettke, 2006). 
Therefore, the World Bank encouraged high levels of government investment in schooling 
in an attempt to increase the quality of human capital.  
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However, there is slight evidence to suggest that efforts to improve the levels of physical 
and human capital in developing countries, especially in Africa, have failed to generate high 
growth (Easterly, 2006).  Easterly (2001) presents how African states had larger increases 
in the number of schools than any other countries since 1960. Yet these countries remained 
mired in poverty while Asian ‘‘tigers’’ like South Korea and Taiwan had smaller increases 
in education levels but flourished economically. The justifications for these situations are 
illustrated by Pritchett (2001) when he found that in some states under specific conditions 
the institutional environment might be so perverse that increasing education actually leads 
to lower growth.  
According to North (2009) and North et al. (2008) societal payoffs for improvements in the 
levels of both physical and human capital are probably dependent on the institutional 
conditions in which those investments occur. In countries with good institutions where the 
social, political, and legal rules provide for protected property rights, fair contract 
enforcement and reliance on a free market mechanism guide economic activity, investments 
in capital are beneficial to individuals and also create a positive impact on the economy as 
a whole (Carson and Prado, 2016). On the other hand, in countries with poor institutions, 
the higher returns to investments are in the rent-seeking activities of those who plunder the 
wealth of others, through lobbying powerful members of the community in an alliance with 
military, political, religious, and economic elites. 
This study begins by integrating this hypothesis into the augmented Solow (1956) growth 
model. In this respect, the theoretical approach used is a clear addition to the work of 
Dawson (1998) who was the first to integrate institutions into the standard growth models. 
This hypothesis is then empirically tested by interacting governance with both physical and 
human capital in cross-country growth regressions. Thus, this study is closely connected to 
the valuable work of Ahmad and Marwan (2012), Bennett (2014), Hall et al. (2010), Jalilian 
et al. (2007), Stroup (2007), Stroup (2008) who used  a similar approach to separate out the 
impact of political and economic institutions on economic growth. 
 
3. Theoretical framework, estimation approach  and data sources 
This paper formalises the institutional impact on growth by utilising a basic neoclassical 
growth framework and augmenting it with institutional characteristics based on regulatory 
quality.  Such a clear growth framework would does tends to allow an explicit modelling 
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of the institutions’ channel of impact and  can eventually provide a better understanding of 
its relationship with economic growth. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
This study investigates the relationship between economic growth and governance, and it 
utilises a conceptual framework drawn from Dawson (1998) and Hall et al. (2010) which 
are in turn based on the Solow (1956) growth model3. Consider the following Cobb-Douglas 
function which exhibits constant returns to scale (0 < αi < 1 & α1 + α2 + α3 = 1) but 
diminishing returns to individual factors. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑖𝑡 𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼1 𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝛼2 𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛼3                                              (1) 
Where Y is real output  produced by Kit, the physical capital, Lit, the amount of labour and 
Hit, human capital; i and t represents individual countries and time respectively The term 
Ait is often denoted as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or Multifactor Productivity (MFP) 
and is designated to capture a host of factors that affect the overall efficiency of the 
economy. These factors according to Mankiw et al. (1992) reflect not just the technology 
level , but also other factors, such as resource endowments, climate, quality of management 
and governance, the strength of institutions and property rights, and cultural factors, and so 
on (the institutional term is added to the list by Campos and Nugent (1999))4. The income 
per capita function results from dividing by L and revises equation (1) in per worker terms: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =   𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼1 ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝛼2  𝐴𝑖𝑡             
This traditional model implicitly assumes an underlying set of good institutions. In this 
model, the quality of institutions affects output through the effect that institutions have on 
the productivity of human and physical capital.  Consequently, the notion of institutions 
affecting TFP can obviously be incorporated into the model via a function of A, such as in 
Hall et al. (2010): 
                                                          
3 Dawson (1998) however utilizes the Mankiw et al. (1992) growth model which is a Solow (1956) 
neoclassical growth model augmented with human capital. In his panel analysis, Dawson divides 
his data into three 5-year sub-periods because the data for institutional quality (i.e. economic 
freedom) and human capital is only available in five-year periods. Since this study uses annual data, 
it therefore employs Solow framework with human capital parameter. 
 
4 The primary motivation to use the Solow framework is particularly due to the fact that it has a 
shift parameter. Solow (1956) acknowledges that this term is far from capturing technical change 
solely. It is "a shorthand expression for any shift in the production function" and thus it will capture 
"slowdow ns, speedups,improvements in the education of the labor force, and all sorts of things". 
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                                         (2) 
Where A0 represents the level of technology, I* accounts for the ideal institutions implicitly 
assumed in the classical growth model, and I is the country’s current level of institutional 
quality.  Thus, (I - I*) measures the degree to which the country’s institutions fall short of 
ideal conditions. When (I = I*), in an ideal institutional environment, productive 
entrepreneurship, investments in human and physical capital and the division of labour are 
incentivized in a manner necessary to foster innovation and economic growth (Baumol, 
1990; Holcombe 1998) such that a country is operating on the Production Productivity 
Frontier (PPF). TFP is here structured to serve as a production deflator for a country whose 
institutions are less than ideal, (I < I*), which can be thought of as operating at a point 
inside the PPF.  
Dawson (1998) argues that the specification of the A function in equation (2) implies 
differences in institutions and having an explicit influence on the level of productivity 
across countries. One critical assumption in this specification is that institutions are 
considered to affect growth via a TFP channel and not only via investment but also through 
human capital5. 
Substituting equation (1) into (2) in per capita terms and taking the logs of the function, 
will lead to the following equation: 
ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ln 𝐴0 + (𝛼1 + 𝑏1(𝐼𝑖 − 𝐼
∗) ln ℎ𝑖𝑡 + (𝛼2 + 𝑏2(𝐼𝑖 − 𝐼
∗))𝑙𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡                 (3) 
We focus on the extent to which the growth of physical and human capital per worker 
explain the growth of output per worker following Pritchett (2001) and Hall et al. (2010).  
This is done through taking differences, which gives the growth rate of output as: 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0 + (𝛼1 + 𝑏1(𝐼𝑖 −  𝐼
∗)ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 + (𝛼2 +  𝑏2(𝐼𝑖 −  𝐼
∗))?̂?𝑖𝑡                                  (4) 
 
where ˆ denotes a growth rate. Simplifying 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0 + (𝛼1 − 𝑏1𝐼
∗)ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 + (𝑏1𝐼 )ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 + (𝛼2 −  𝑏2𝐼
∗ )?̂?𝑖𝑡 + (𝑏2 𝐼)?̂?𝑖𝑡                 (5) 
Within this framework, institutions exert a homogenous influence on the productivity of 
human and physical capital across economies. 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝐼𝑖𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2 ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 +  𝐼𝑖𝑡ℎ̂𝑖𝑡                              (6) 
                                                          
5 See Dawson (1998) for more discussion on the possible channel of institutional impact towards 
growth and the consequent assumptions made. 
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Where,  ∝0= ?̂?0 and (𝛼𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝐼
∗) = 𝛿𝑖.  The functional form of Equation (6) with 
appropriate error term and country i and time t specific effect terms is therefore specified 
as the following,  
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜶𝟎 +  𝑰𝒊𝒕?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜹𝟏 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 +  𝜹𝟐 ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 +  𝑰𝒊𝒕ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 +   𝑰𝒊𝒕 +  𝒆𝒊𝒋                 (𝟕) 
Equation (7) presents a heuristic way of testing the institutional effects on growth via its 
impact on productivity. This equation is used to assess the direct effect of institutions on 
the level of income per capita and differenced to examine how institutional change affects 
economic growth.  
 
 
 3.2 Estimation approach 
While using a pooled OLS, countries’ unobservable individual effects are not controlled 
therefore the heterogeneity of the countries in the analysis can influence the measurements 
of the estimated parameters (Tiwari  and Kalita, 2011). Furthermore,   using a panel data 
model with the incorporation of individual effects can have numerous benefits, for example, 
allowing us to account for individual heterogeneity.  Indeed, developing countries differ 
regarding their colonial history, political regimes, ideologies, and religious affiliations, 
geographical sites and climatic environments, not to mention a broad range of other 
country-specific variables.  In addition, if this heterogeneity is not taken into account it will 
inevitably bias the results, no matter how large the sample is. Therefore, by integrating 
countries’ unobservable individual effects in equation (7) the model to be estimated is as 
follows: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜶𝟎 +  𝑰𝒊𝒕?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜹𝟏 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 +  𝜹𝟐 ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 +  𝑰𝒊𝒕ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 +   𝑰𝒊𝒕 +  𝒘𝒊𝒋                 (𝟖) 
Where, wij =µi + eij with µi being countries’ unobservable individual effects. The difference 
between a pooled OLS regression and a model considering unobservable individual effects 
lies precisely in µi (Gujarati, 2004). 
To test the relevance of unobservable individual effects the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
could be used with the null hypothesis of the irrelevance of unobservable individual effects 
(Mátyás and Sevestre, 2008). Also, there may be a correlation between countries’ 
unobservable effects and growth determinants. If there is no correlation, the most 
appropriate way of carrying out such analysis is using a panel model of random effects 
(Higgins and Green, 2008).  Hausman test is used to test for the possible existence of a 
correlation.  
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3.3 Data sources and variables 
 
 An annual panel observation for 97 countries including 19 Arab countries (see Appendix 
2) for 20 years over 1995 to 2014 has been utilised for this study.  Data are obtained from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank (2015). The dependent 
variable is real per capita GDP growth, while explanatory variables are as follows: the 
population growth variable and gross investment are respective proxies for the rates of 
growth of factor inputs (labour and capital) in the production process, and secondary school 
enrolment rate is added as a proxy for the quality of human capital.  
Regulatory quality is used as a proxy for governance and institutions following measures 
of governance by Kaufmann and Kraay (2003). The measures are perhaps the most widely 
quoted governance indicators, based on perceptions developed for 212 countries.  
Regulatory quality presents the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and apply sound policies and regulations that promote private sector development.  
Effective regulation achieves the social progress goals which are set out by the government 
for the regulatory authority. In emerging countries, the social advancement objectives of 
regulation are unlikely to be directly concerned with the aim of economic efficiency, but 
with broader goals to improve sustainable progress and poverty reduction.  Efficient 
regulation achieves the social prosperity goals with minimum economic costs (Jalilian et 
al., 2007). 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values for all the 
variables in the analysis for both groups of countries. It shows that both economic growth 
and governance in Arab regions are below the world average, while it is higher in 
population growth6.  













Obs 1732 1736 1270 1644 1305 
Mean 2.37 1.57 78.87 21.38 0.16 
Std. Dev. 5.1 1.72 30.73 6.5 1.04 
Min -62.46 -3.82 5.19 -2.42 -2.34 
                                                          
6 Furthermore, Multiple-Sample Comparison tests used to compare the means of the growth rates of the 
regions, show that there is significant difference between the means for Arab countries and those of all 
countries (always at better than 1% level) for all institutional and the per capita income. In contrast, for the 
secondary school enrolment variables, it is not significant (at 5% level). 
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Max 102.77 17.48 165.58 59.72 2.24 
Arab Countries  
Obs 377 399 273 345 285 
Mean 1.75 2.91 69.66 22.42 -0.38 
Std. Dev. 8.58 2.55 27.50 7.84 0.76 
Min -62.46 -0.30 10.90 2.91 -2.16 
Max 102.77 17.48 124.29 58.95 1.11 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The first step in the econometric analysis was to examine the degree of integration of the 
variables in equation (8). Appendix 3 presents the results of the panel unit-root test to ensure 
the variables are integrated in the same order based on Levin -Lin-Chu (LLC) test (2002), 
Im, Pesaran and Shin test (IPS) (2003). The results indicate that the series are generally 
stationary at a 1% level with intercept (intercept and trend in the case of school enrolment 
(H)). This allows estimating the regression for all countries and Arab countries using the 
standard methods as described below. 
The analysis run pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimations which are meant 
to check the robustness of the results. Explicitly, they allow for appropriate comparison 
with previous institutional studies that use similar estimation methods. The strategy is to 
run the estimations in two stages, firstly for the whole sample of 97 countries, and secondly 
for a sample consisting of 19 Arab countries only. The main objective of this strategy is to 
identify the similarities or differences in the level of significance of the institutional quality 
variable. The estimated results are presented in Table 2 and 3. The Tables contains results 
of static panel data models from estimating the baseline growth model formalised in 
equation (8) for the whole and ACs samples respectively. 
Based on the results in Tables 2 and 3, the overall F-statistics are significant in all panel 
data models, and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the explanatory 
variables do not explain (taken as a whole) changes in the dependent variable. Hence the 
determinants selected in this study can be considered sufficient to explain variations in the 
real per capita GDP growth. In addition, this finding, coupled with significant coefficients 
of the human capital and investment variables clearly supports the assumption that 
economic resources affect growth via the factor productivity channel.  
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Regarding Table 2 for the whole sample, the Pooled OLS model ignores the potential for 
unobserved heterogeneity and thus overcomes the panel nature of the data altogether. The 
LM was used to test this (Mátyás and Sevestre, 2006). The result indicated the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the irrelevance of unobservable individual effects and implied that a 
pooled OLS regression would not be the most appropriate. That is, country-specific 
heterogeneity plays a significant role in economic growth. Therefore, it should be 
incorporated into the model. Furthermore, the Hausman test was insignificant, and the null 
hypothesis of the absence of correlation between countries’ unobservable individual effects 
and growth determinants was not rejected, and therefore the random effect model was most 
appropriate. Therefore, the analysis of the relationship in equation (8) is a panel model with 
random effects.   
    *Denote significant at 5% level 
 
All coefficients in the random effects model are positive and statistically significant, which 
reflects the importance of each component to contribute to higher growth rate. These results 
are consistent with Ahmad and Marwan (2012) and Jalilian et al. (2007). While Hall et al. 
(2010) have found the same results for only coefficients on both interaction terms, the 
coefficients on the change in physical capital and the change in human capital are negative 
and significant. The outcomes are consistent with those of Olson et al. (2000)  who found 
that productivity growth is strongly correlated with the quality of governance and Kauffman 
et al. (2005) who found that the quality of governance has a positive effect on incomes. 
In Table 3 for only the Arab countries sample, there is evidence of potential unobserved 
heterogeneity across ACs owing to the insignificance of the estimated chi2 of the Lagrange 
Table 2: Estimated Panel data Models for the whole sample of 97 countries 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita  
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Ln(h) 1.66923* 0.063545 0.469383* 0.030611 0.555595* 0.033024 
Ln(k) 0.055368 0.083744 0.097113* 0.024476 0.072277* 0.026859 
I 0.19377* 0.370849 0.299432* 0.137143 0.3443* 0.150289 
Ln(h*I) 0.70527* 0.067806 0.036207* 0.029219 0.072552* 0.03189 
Ln(k*I) 0.31167* 0.080471 0.100885* 0.023963 0.095309* 0.026289 
_cons 0.8303* 0.380206 6.296519* 0.14507 5.791999* 0.176379 
F test 0.0000 0.00000 
 












Multiplier.  Moreover, the OLS estimated standard errors are only valid when the errors are 
homoscedastic and not correlated (within individual countries) over time. As shown in 
Appendix 4, it is clear that there is a weak correlation over time, which is very consistent 
with this result, indicating that there is probably no observed individual heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, the estimated robust standard errors are approximately similar to the standard 
OLS ones (see Appendix 5) (Mátyás and Sevestre, 2006).  Therefore, pooled OLS 
regression will be the most appropriate for ACs analysis. 
The estimated pooled OLS results in Table 3 show that, while the coefficient of human 
capital is positive and significant, it is relatively small compared to the whole world sample 
(Table 2), which reflects the poor quality of human resources in ACs and its effect on 
production output. The insignificance of the interaction term between human capital and 
governance confirm this remarkable state , which is consistent with the average adult 
literacy rate in the region only reaching 72.9% by  2012 (Huebler and Lu, 2015).  A UNDP 
(2011) Report of Arab Development Challenges concluded that the Arab region suffers 
from well-known quality issues that do not equip the youth with the tools they need to 
succeed in the modern world, including joining the mainstream economic activity. The 
regulatory environment in some of the countries does not encourage private investment in 
vocational and tertiary skills development as has been the case in some other regions, e.g. 
IT services and technical colleges in India. The region has failed to sustain job-creating 
growth and faces an explosive situation of youth unemployment particularly acute amongst 
the educated. This was one of the causes of the ‘Arab Spring’. 
The governance variable (Regulatory Quality), is significant but with adverse affect, which 
probably again explains the reason for the ‘Arab Spring’ in the region. Another significant 
finding from this result is that both investment and governance variables are statistically 
significant which means that the effect of institutions could possibly run totally through the 
investment channel if Arab states improve the quality of governance. The result confirms 
that institutional quality in ACs and developing countries is inferior and faces many 
problems as noted by Ahmad and Marwan (2012), Hall et al. (2010), Jalilian et al. (2007), 
Nabli (2007). 
Furthermore, when the governance parameter interacts with the investment, it reduces the 
size of the investment effect on growth from 0.5881 to 0.3084 in the Pooled OLS (this is 
rather reinforced in the whole sample model in Table 2).  
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The most striking result from the baseline model is that the coefficient of the governance 
variable is significant and positively determines growth in the whole sample, while it is 
negative in the ACs sample. Using an F-test to compare regression coefficients of 
governance across the two models there appears to be a significant difference. By the 
standards of virtually any major metric measuring the quality of governance in a particular 
country, Arab countries routinely rank well below the global average. The findings of the 
World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators provide the starkest evidence of the 
mismanagement and misrule produced by many of the region’s governments (Kwon and 
Kim, 2014). 
Table 3: Estimate Panel data Models for Arab Countries only 
 Dependent Variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita   
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Ln(h) 0.47385* 0.231656 -0.07677 0.527673 0.364474 0.297257 
Ln(k) 0.5881* 0.196035 0.389475 0.281736 0.49475* 0.223046 
I -3.0965* 1.154559 -0.3417 2.481227 -2.1772 1.449801 
Ln(h*I) 0.502005 0.27343 0.382375 0.628943 0.343152 0.353855 
Ln(k*I) 0.308405* 0.159479 -0.17891 0.284816 0.244286 0.181694 
_cons -2.41364* 1.219888 0.782719 2.254784 -1.60163 1.477812 
F test 0.0062 0.0346 
 











*Denote significant at 5% level 
 
5.    Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on the factors that boost productivity 
growth in Arab countries (ACs) through estimating Total factor productivity (TFP) 
function. Two main estimations were undertaken.  The first is for the whole sample of 97 
countries and the second for Arab countries only. The main objective of this strategy is to 
test the nature and level of significance of institutional quality impact, directly and 
indirectly, on economic growth in both samples. 
Arab countries have experienced a dramatically poor economic performance since the early 
1990s. The overall growth performance of the Arab countries has been both mixed and 
characterised by a higher degree of volatility in comparison with other regions of the world. 
These episodes of high and low growth are indeed an interesting case study from the 
institutional perspective. Utilising the Solow growth framework augmented with 
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governance variable, this study achieved the intended objectives to find empirical support 
for the proposition that   ‘institutions matter’  for economic growth in ACs especially after 
the ‘Arab Spring’ and to show that the institutional growth-effect essentially runs via total 
factor productivity channels. 
The estimated regression results suggest that governance in Arab countries over the last two 
decades have had a limited role in economic growth, which might not seem surprising given 
that some of the previous studies have reached similar conclusions.  
The return of human capital for Arab countries is smaller than the whole world sample, 
which reflects the poor quality of human resources and its effect on production output. 
Unfortunately, the Arab region is heavily dependent on imports for the basic survival of its 
population and has not managed to use its wealth of natural and human resources to 
negotiate for a more even playing field and a more significant role in the evolving 
international order. 
The provision of a regulatory regime that promotes rather than constrains economic growth 
is an important part of good governance. The ability of the state to provide effective 
regulatory institutions can be expected to be a determinant of how well markets and the 
economy perform. The impact of regulatory institutions on economic growth will depend 
on both the efficiency of the regulatory policies and instruments that are used and the quality 
of the governance processes that are practised by the regulators.  
Moreover, these results focus attention on institutional reform as the key to economic 
progress so that future increases in the physical and human capital will generate positive 
social returns as well as private ones.  Indeed, the ACs are in need of an economic 
development approach that targets resolving social issues related to inequality and poverty. 
Stiglitz (2002) promotes a vision where development strategies must incorporate economic 
as well as social objectives.  Such development will be accomplished through government 
transparency, communities’ participatory processes, international organisations exchange, 
and openness to international markets. “Too often, development is interpreted as being 
identical with economic development, the increase in per capita GDP”, but what does social 
development in fields like education and health mean? It is true that increases in per capita 
income are helpful for improving social sectors, but while economic growth and social 
development “tend to move together, there is far from perfect correlation” (Stiglitz, 2002). 
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However, these results need further investigation and confirmation to determine the 
contribution of socioeconomic reform programs in the Arab region on the growth pattern 
and development. Thus, additional empirical studies are needed to verify the nature of the 
relationship between governance and economic development in ACs, in order to find out 
whether governance is causing economic development or development is causing 
governance.  
In sum, charting an Arab development path in human dignity that promotes (social, 
economic and political) inclusion, social justice and equity, is not only desirable, it is also 
within reach.  In fact, all the necessary endowments – regarding natural, human and 
financial resources – are widely available within the region.  The window of opportunity to 
chart this new way was instigated by the people of the Arab region themselves in their  call 
for human dignity and demands for “bread, freedom and social justice” - a slogan of 
revolution which captures the inseparability and interdependence of economic, social and 
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Figure 1: The pattern of GDP per capita growth in the Arab States compared to other regions 
(1995-2014)7 
 
Sources: Based on World Development Indicators (2014), World Bank (Year2014) 
 
Figure 2: GDP per capita growth function in the Arab States compared to other regions, 
1995 – 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
                                                          
7  Arab World: ARB, Sub-Saharan Africa: SSF, South Asia: SAS, Latin America & Caribbean: 
LCN, Europe & Central Asia: ECS, East Asia Pacific: EAS, and World: WLD.  
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Appendix 2: List of countries included in the analysis 
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Appendix 3: Panel Unit Root Tests for variables in level  
Tests  



























Source: Authors’ calculations using EViews 8.  
Note: Values in parentheses refer to the probability of the test statistics. The null hypothesis of 
Levin, Lin & Chu t-test assumes common unit root process, while the others assume individual unit 
root process.    
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 Appendix 4: The correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals over time for the 
Arab Countries’ sample 
  uols_1 uols_2 uols_3 uols_4 
uols 0.4461 0.3855 -0.0369 -0.1437 
 
Appendix 5: The robust of standard errors for Arab sample 
ly Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
lh 0.47385 0.298735 1.59 0.131 -0.15643 1.104126 
lk1 0.588131 0.307921 1.91 0.073 -0.06153 1.237787 
rq -3.09651 1.810729 -1.71 0.105 -6.91682 0.723791 
Hrq 0.502005 0.439785 1.14 0.269 -0.42586 1.42987 
Krq 0.308405 0.228943 1.35 0.196 -0.17462 0.791432 
_cons -2.41364 1.958348 -1.23 0.235 -6.54539 1.718117 
 
 
